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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wally Schultz was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) in one case and felony domestic violence (battery) in another. 
Although the two cases were largely unrelated, they were, at times, handled together in 
the district court and then consolidated in the present appeal. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Schultz pled guilty in the possession case. 
On appeal, he raises no issues related to that case. 
The battery case, however, proceeded to a jury trial wherein the prosecutor 
made certain arguments which Mr. Schultz now contends were improper. Specifically, 
Mr. Schultz asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by implicitly commenting 
on Mr. Schultz' failure to testify, and by exhorting the jury to convict Mr. Schultz based 
on sympathy for the alleged domestic violence victim, a desire to protect her from 
further abuse, and a desire to cure society's domestic violence problems generally. 
The State has responded with a number of arguments. Preliminarily, the State 
contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to even consider Mr. Schultz' appeal because, 
the State alleges, the notice of appeal was untimely. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) 
Turning to the merits of Mr. Schultz' claims, after setting forth a questionable recitation 
of the legal standards applicable to claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments, the State attempts to characterize the prosecutor's arguments in such a way 
that they are not comments on Mr. Schultz' silence or exhortations to convict 
Mr. Schultz based on matters outside the evidence, and then asserts that those 
arguments do not constitute misconduct, much less misconduct that is so egregious as 
to rise to the level of fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-19.) Finally, the 
State argues that, because it believes that evidence against Mr. Schultz is 
overuvhelming, any errors arising out of the prosecutor's arguments are harmless. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 1 9-20.) 
This Reply Brief highlights a number of flaws in the State's arguments. First, this 
Court does, in fact, have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Schultz' appeal because the notice 
of appeal in this case was, in fact, timely. Second, the State's recitation of the legal 
standards applicable to claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments is 
misleading. Third, the State has mischaracterized the prosecutor's comments on 
Mr. Schultz' silence in an effort to make them appear to be comments on the evidence. 
Fourth, the State has mischaracterized the prosecutor's emotional pleas in an effort to 
make them appear to be comments on the evidence. Fifth, the State's "harmless error" 
argument is based on a misunderstanding of the standard articulated in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U .S. 18 (1 967). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in 
Mr. Schultz' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
ISSUE 
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct necessitating a new trial? 
ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Schultz argued that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct (rising to the level of fundamental, reversible error) at two points during his 
closing argument. First, Mr. Schultz argued that the prosecutor improperly commented 
on Mr. Schultz' exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.8-10.) The offending argument was as follows: 
There are five things that have to be present in order for there to be self- 
defense, and I want you to think about the evidence in this case, and 
particularly the only testimony that touched on this, and that would be the 
testimony of Laurie Morrill. Nobody else testified about it. There wasn't 
any other testimony about it because there were only two people present: 
Laurie Morrill and the defendant. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls.7-14 (emphasis added).) Mr. Schultz argued 
that prosecutor improperly exhorted the jury to convict Mr. Schultz based on matters 
outside the evidence, namely its sympathy for the alleged victim, its desire to protect her 
from further abuse, and to protect others and cure society's domestic problems 
generally. (Appellant's Brief, pp. I 1-14,) This time, the offending argument was as 
follows: 
A wise judge once told me that we're in the business of giving out 
hope. Laurie Morrill needs some hope. She needs to know that the 
system works. Show her the system works. You can protect Laurie 
Morrill and other Laurie Morrill's [sic] by weighing the evidence and 
returning a just and correct verdict. You can hold the defendant 
accountable. I ask you to do that. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
As noted above, the State has responded with a number of arguments. 
Preliminarily, the State contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to even consider 
Mr. Schultz' appeal because, the State alleges, the notice of appeal was untimely. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) Turning to the merits of Mr. Schultz' claims, after setting 
forth a questionable recitation of the legal standards applicable to claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, the State attempts to characterize 
the prosecutor's arguments in such a way that they are not comments on Mr. Schultz' 
silence or exhortations to convict Mr. Schultz based on matters outside the evidence, 
and then asserts that those arguments do not constitute misconduct, much less 
misconduct that is so egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-19.) Finally, the State argues that, because it believes that 
evidence against Mr. Schultz is overwhelming, any errors arising out of the prosecutor's 
arguments are harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-20.) 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, however, the State's arguments are 
without merit. 
A. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Decide Mr. Schultz' Appeal On Its Merits 
As was discussed in Mr. Schultz' Appellant's Brief (p.4), he was sentenced in the 
Battery Case on December 12, 2005, receiving a unified sentence of ten years, with five 
years fixed, and a rider. (Battery Case, R., pp.150, 153; Battery Case Augmented 
Tr., p.105, Ls.16-24.) The district court filed its judgment of conviction on December 15, 
2005. (Battery Case R., pp. 151 -55.) 
Following his rider, at a review hearing on May 22, 2006, Mr. Schultz' sentence 
was suspended and he was placed on probation for a term of five years. (Battery Case 
Augmented Tr., p.1 I I ,  Ls.21-24.) That same day, the district court issued a one- 
paragraph "Temporary Order on Rider Review," stating as follows: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above 
defendant be sentenced to: Previouslv ordered sentence is suspended 
Parole office before 5:00 p.m. today. (A copy of the formal paperwork will 
be forfhcoming as soon as possible.) 
(Battery Case R., p.162 (underlining in original; italics added).) Three days later, on 
May 25, 2006, the district court entered a formal seven-page Order Upon 180-Day 
Review Hearing, I.C. 3 19-2601(4). (Battery Case R., pp.164-70.) 
Exactly forty-two days after the district court's issuance of its formal order placing 
Mr. Schultz on probation, on July 6, 2006, Mr. Schultz filed his notice of appeal. 
(Battery Case R., pp.164-70.) In his Appellant's Brief (p.6)' Mr. Schultz asserted that 
this notice of appeal was timely from his judgment of conviction pursuant to I.A.R. 14(a) 
because it was filed 42 days from the date of the formal order placing him on probation. 
The State now contends, however, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
any matters related to Mr. Schultz' conviction and original sentence because the notice 
of appeal was not filed within 42 days of the time that Mr. Schultz was placed on 
probation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) Critical to the State's argument is the 
assumption that the defendant is placed "on probation" for purposes of I.A.R. 14(a), 
and, thus, his time to appeal the judgment of conviction begins to run, when the district 
court orally pronounces its decision to place him on probation or issues a temporary 
order to that effect, not when the district court enters a formal order summarizing the 
facts and the law, and spelling out the terms of probation. (See Respondent's Brief, 
The State's argument is flawed, however, because, where the district court has 
made an oral ruling placing the defendant on probation and its only written order on the 
subject states on its face that that order is only "temporary" (and, thus, will presumably 
expire or be vacated in the near future) such that a formal order will be forthcoming, the 
defendant has no realistic expectation in his ability to appeal because he might believe 
his notice of appeal to be premature as to the district court's forthcoming formal 
probation order.' Thus, if the State's position is to be adopted, defendants in cases 
such as this one would potentially be in the position of filing two notices of appeal-one 
from the judgment of conviction and one from the formal probation or relinquishment 
order. Such an approach is not only inefficient, but also confusing. A far more sensible 
and equitable approach is to hold that a defendant is placed "on probation" for purposes 
of ldaho Appellate Rule 14(a) when a formal written order is entered placing the 
defendant on probation. That way the defendant has an order certain from which to 
appeal, and a date certain from which to measure his time to appeal. 
B. Contraw To The State's Assertion, Prosecutors Do Not Have Greater Leewav To 
Engage In Misconduct In Closing Arguments Because Of Their "lmprovisational 
Nature" 
In reciting the legal standards applicable to claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
during closing arguments, the State implies that misconduct committed during that 
stage of the trial is less likely to warrant relief for the defendant because the prosecutor 
is less culpable for his misconduct due to the "improvisational nature" of closing 
arguments. (See Respondent's Brief, p.1 I .) Specifically, the State cites State v. Field, 
' But see I.A.R. 17(e)(2) ("A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment, order 
or decree before formal written entry of such document shall become valid upon the 
filing and the placing the stamp of the clerk of the court on such appealable judgment, 
order or decree, without refiling the notice of appeal."); State v. Fortin, 124 ldaho 323, 
326, 859 P.2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that ldaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(l)(C) 
provides that a notice of appeal from a judgment is deemed to include all post-judgment 
orders and decrees). 
144 ldaho 559, 5"7, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007), for the proposition that "[tlhe ldaho 
Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of reviewing closing arguments in 
light of their improvisational nature . . . ." (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Such an 
argument, however, is meritless. First, it defies logic, as there is no reason to believe 
that closing arguments are any more improvisational in nature than any other portion of 
a trial, such as the examination of a witness. Second, even assuming that the 
prosecutor's closing argument is particularly improvisational, the Field Court certainly 
did not "recently reiterate[ ] the importance of reviewing closing arguments in light of 
their improvisational nature," as the State now claims. In fact, Field involved a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct in the questioning of a witness, not during closing arguments. 
Field, 144 at 571 -72, 165 P.2d at 285-86. Third, the State fails to explain how, if, as it 
argues elsewhere in its brief, "the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor" (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 
(1982))), it should be entitled to any leeway because the prosecutor's statements were 
made "on the fly" and the prosecutor was, therefore, less culpable. In other words, the 
State's request is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and 
overlooks the fact that the crux of Mr. Schultz' prosecutorial misconduct claim is that he 
was denied a fair trial by the prosecutorial arguments in question. Accordingly, contrary 
to the State's claim, The State ought not to be cut any slack simply because the 
prosecutor may have been improvising when he made arguments that had the effect of 
denying Mr. Schultz a fair trial. 
C.  
Draw A Neqative Inference From Mr. Schultz' Decision Not To Testify 
The State claims that the prosecutor did not comment on Mr. Schultz' silence 
when, in his closing argument, he argued as follows: 
There are five things that have to be present in order for there to be self- 
defense, and I want you to think about the evidence in this case, and 
particularly the only testimony that touched on this, and that would be the 
testimony of Laurie Morrill. Nobody else testified about it. There wasn't 
any other testimony about it because there were only two people present: 
Laurie Morri/l and the defendant. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls.7-14 (emphasis added).) The State asserts that 
the above-quoted language was a permissible "comment on the state of the evidence." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.12.) Specifically, the State argues that "a fair reading of the 
prosecutor's statement in this case is not that it was made to ask the jury to infer 
Schultz's guilt from his failure to testify. Rather, the prosecutor's statement expressly 
called attention to the 'five things that have to be present in order for there to be self- 
defense' and the absence of any evidence indicating Schultz hit and kicked Ms. Morrill 
out of self-defense." (Respondent's Brief, p. 13.) Although the State apparently 
concedes that the prosecutor's argument would have constituted misconduct if 
Mr. Schultz had been the only witness who could have contradicted Ms. Morrill's 
testimony (see Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-1 3 (quoting State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 31 2, 
143 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2006))), it claims that the prosecutor's argument was nothing 
more than a general discussion of the state of the evidence because witnesses other 
than Mr. Schultz could have refuted Ms. Morrill's testimony and supported a self- 
defense argument: 
While Schultz' reasonable belief in the need to act in self-defense 
could have been shown through his testimony at trial, evidence of his 
alleged self-defense could also have been shown by circumstantial 
evidence through the testimony of other witnesses. For example, the 
officer who observed Schultz in response to the 9-1-1 call could have 
testified as to whether he observed any scratches or injuries to Schultz or 
whether Schultz's clothing appeared ripped or torn. The prosecutor's 
comment was a fair comment on the state of the evidence and the 
insufficiency of the evidence, in general, to demonstrate Schultz's 
reasonable belief in the necessity to defend himself. As the context of the 
prosecutor's closing argument reflects, this statement simply encouraged 
the jury to weigh the evidence of self-defense and reject it. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-14.) 
The State's present attempt to re-characterize the above-quoted portion of the 
prosecutor's closing argument as a proper discussion of the state of the evidence 
generally, as opposed to an overt reference to Mr. Schultz' exercise of his right not to 
testify, is extremely disingenuous. In fact, the prosecutor's closing argument, on its 
face, disproves the State's present characterization of that argument. As quoted above, 
the prosecutor's closing argument specifically made reference to the fact that the only 
possible evidence on the self-defense issue would have been the testimony of 
Ms. Morrill and Mr. Schultz: "There wasn't any other testimony about it because there 
were only two people present: Laurie Morrill and the defendant." (Battery Case 
Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls. 12-1 4.) Accordingly, the prosecutor's statements simply 
cannot be interpreted (as the State now suggests) as an argument that the defense 
could have supported its self-defense theory with testimony from any number of 
witnesses. Indeed, contrary to the State's claims on appeal, the argument in question 
necessarily suggested that, because only two people could have testified about the self- 
defense issue, and because one of those two people, Mr. Schultz, did not take the 
witness stand to contradict the other's, Ms. Morrill's, testimony, the jury should infer that 
Mr. Schultz is guilty. As noted, this suggestion was plainly improper. See State v. 
McMurry, 143 ldaho 312, 315-16, 143 P.3d 400,403-04 (Ct. App. 2006). 
D. The Prosecutor Enqaaed In Misconduct When He Uraed The Jurv To Find 
Works," And To Protect Her And Others Like Her 
The State also claims that the prosecutor did not seek to have the jury find 
Mr. Schultz guilty based on matters outside the evidence, i.e., the jurors' emotions, 
when, in his closing argument, he argued as follows: 
A wise judge once told me that we're in the business of giving out 
hope. Laurie Morrill needs some hope. She needs to know that the 
system works. Show her the system works. You can protect Laurie 
Morrill and other Laurie Morrill's [sic] by weighing the evidence and 
returning a just and correct verdict. You can hold the defendant 
accountable. I ask you to do that. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.6 (emphasis added).) The State 
asserts that the above-quoted language "did not appeal to the emotions of the jurors, 
but instead merely requested the jury to fulfill its duty and 'show . . . the system 
works . . . by weighing the evidence and returning a just and correct verdict."' 
(Respondent's Brief, p.16 (quoting a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Respondent's Brief, p. 18 (providing the same partial quote 
of the prosecutor's closing argument), p.19.) In support of this claim, the State attempts 
to distinguish many of the cases (cited in Mr. Schultz' Appellant's Brief) in which the 
ldaho courts have found misconduct in prosecutors' pleas to convict defendants based 
on matters outside the trial evidence. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 17-1 8.) 
The State's present attempt to re-characterize the above-quoted portion of the 
prosecutor's closing argument as a proper request for the jury to weigh the trial 
evidence and return a guilty verdict based on that evidence, as opposed to a plea to 
convict Mr. Schultz based on matters outside the evidence, is aimost as disingenuous 
as its attempt (discussed in section C ,  above) to re-characterize the prosecutor's 
comment on Mr. Schultz'silence. This is so for a number of reasons. 
First, although the State does fully quote the argument that is in question at one 
point in its Respondent's Brief (pp.14-15), in re-characterizing that argument as a 
request for the jury to consider only the trial evidence, the State repeatedly misleading 
quotes only a portion of the argument in question. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.16, 18, 
19.) Twice, the State misleading quotes the prosecutor's argument as asking the jury to 
"show . . . the system works . . . by weighing the evidence and returning a just and 
correct verdict." (Respondent's Brief, pp.16, 18.) In so doing, the State conveniently 
omits the improper portions of the prosecutor's argument: those portions where the 
prosecutor urged the jury to reach a guilty verdict to give the victim "some hope," to 
show the victim that "the system works," to protect the victim from future abuse, and to 
protect all women ("other Laurie Morrill's [sic]") from domestic violence. (Compare 
Respondent's Brief, pp.16, 18 with Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.6.) 
In addition, later in its brief, although the State acknowledges some of the improper 
portions of the prosecutor's argument (see Respondent's Brief, p.19 (acknowledging 
that the prosecutor asked the jury to "[s]how her [Laurie] the system works," and to give 
the victim hope)), it still neglects to mention what are probably the most egregious 
portions of the prosecutor's argument: those portions where the prosecutor urged the 
jury to reach a guilty verdict to protect the victim from future abuse, and to protect all 
women ("other Laurie Morrill's [sic]") from domestic violence. (Compare Respondent's 
Brief, p.19 with Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.6.) 
Second, with regard to the most egregious portions of the prosecutor's argument, 
i.e., the portion described above wherein the prosecutor urged the jury to convict 
Mr. Schultz in order to protect Ms. Schultz from future abuse, and to protect all women 
from domestic violence, the State offers no explanation of how that argument could 
possibly be proper. (See generally Respondent's Brief, pp.14-19.) Indeed, although the 
State discusses United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), it offers 
no cogent explanation of why such a plea did not violate the Ninth Circuit's 
admonishment, quoted in Mr. Schultz' Appellant's Brief (p.12 n.9), that prosecutors not 
ask jurors to convict defendants in order to cure societal problems2: 
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order 
to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future 
lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the 
defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or 
innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by 
convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing 
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a 
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear. 
Weatherspoon, 41 0 F.3d at 1149. Moreover, the State's attempts to distinguish State v. 
Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1998), on the basis that, "[tlhis is . . . not 
a case where the prosecutor made 'reference to the jurors' families and hypothesized 
the commission of a crime against them," and State v. Baruth, 107 ldaho 651, 691 P.2d 
1266 (Ct. App. 1984), on the basis that this is not "a case where the prosecutor told the 
jury it was responsible for protecting the community," are unavailing since there is no 
meaningful difference between the pleas that were found to be improper in Pecor and 
The State's attempt to distinguish Weatherspoon consisted of: (a) pointing out that, in 
this case, the prosecutor's improper plea was made only once, while in Weatherspoon it 
had been made repeatedly; and (b) asserting, in wholly conclusory fashion, that, unlike 
in Weatherspoon, the prosecutor's argument in this case "did not appeal to the 
emotions of the jurors . . . ." (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) 
Baruth, and those that were made in this case. The reality is that asking the jury to 
convict Mr. Schultz in order to protect not only the alleged victim, Laurie Morrill, but all of 
the other potential victims in society is tantamount to a plea to convict Mr. Schultz based 
on the jurors to protect themselves, their own families, and the community at-large. 
Third, the State attempts to distinguish State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 
583 (Ct. App. 2007), based on the conclusory claim that in this case, uniike in Phillips, 
"the prosecutor's isolated remark . . . was neither inflammatory nor obviously calculated 
to appeal to the jury's passion or emotion." (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) However, this 
argument by the State overlooks the fact that there was no reason for the prosecutor to 
have talked about giving the victim "hope" and showing "her the system works" if not to 
ask the jury to render a guilty verdict out of sympathy for her.3 
Fourth, the State attempts to distinguish State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 181 
P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2007), based on the claim that "@]onfrary to Schultz's assertions, 
this is not a case where the prosecutor mischaracterized Schultz's defense to appeal to 
concerns about protecting the public." (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) However, this 
attempt to distinguish Beebe is based on a false premise since Mr. Schultz never 
The State also attempts to distinguish State v. Peite, 122 ldaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223 
(Ct. App. 1992), which, like Phillips, made it clear that emotional appeals are improper. 
Interestingly though, the State seeks to distinguish Peite, not on the basis that the 
prosecutor here did not attempt to evoke sympathy for the victim, but on the basis that 
this case did not involve "the prosecutor's questioning of a victim for the purpose of 
evoking sympathy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 1 8 (emphasis added).) Obviously though, 
this attempted distinction is artificial, as it is not the timing of the attempt to generate 
sympathy for the victim which is important to the question of whether misconduct 
occurred, but the fact that the prosecutor attempt to generate sympathy for the victim at 
all. And, as noted above, there was no reason for the prosecutor to have talked about 
giving the victim "hope" and showing "her the system works" if not to ask the jury to 
render a guilty verdict out of sympathy for her. 
argued that the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Schultz' defense. (See generally 
Appellant's Brief.) In fact, a close look at Beebe reveals that that case is instructive 
here. In Beebe, part of the prosecutor's misconduct was his attempt to highlight 
concerns about the protection of the public at-large, Beebe, 145 Idaho at 575-76, 181 
P.3d at 501-02, which, as noted above, is exactly what the prosecutor did in this case 
when he urged the jury to convict Mr. Schultz, not only to protect the alleged victim from 
future harm, but also to protect "other Laurie Morrill's [sic]." (See Battery Case 
Augmented Tr., p.64, Ls.3-4.) 
Despite the State's mischaracterization of the relevant portion of the prosecutor's 
closing argument, the reality is that the prosecutor did ask the jury to convict Mr. Schultz 
based on matters outside the evidence. For that reason, this Court should conclude 
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. 
E. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes 
Fundamental Error 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Schultz argued that, not only did the above instance 
of prosecutorial misconduct constitute error, but they rose to the level of fundamental 
error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) Because the State has chosen not to offer any 
specific argument in response to Mr. Schultz' contention in this regard (other than to 
assert generally that, because there was no prosecutorial misconduct, then certainly 
there was no misconduct which rose to the level of fundamental error (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.14, 19)), no reply is necessary. 
F. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes 
Reversible Error 
An alternative argument presented by the State is that, even if it is incorrect in 
arguing that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, any misconduct that was committed 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-20.) In making 
this argument, the State articulates the harmless error standard as follows: "An error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the 
evidence and argument present during the trial, that the jury would have reached the 
same result absent the error." (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-20 (quoting State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1 175, 1 183 (2007))') The State then goes 
on to assert that the jury would have inevitably reached its guilty verdict, even without 
the prosecutorial comments in question, because "[tlhe jury was presented with 
overwhelming evidence" of Mr. Schultz' guilt. (Respondent's Brief, p.20.) 
Notwithstanding Christiansen, which is correctly quoted by the State, Mr. Schultz 
submits that the State argues for application of the wrong harmless error standard. As 
was argued in Mr. Schultz' Appellant's Brief (pp.16-18), constitutional errors (such as 
prosecutorial misconduct) are governed by the standard set forth in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1 967). Under Chapman, the reviewing court determines 
whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
jury's verdict. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Under this standard, ''[Yhe inquiry . . . is not 
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis 
added). For the reasons articulated in Mr. Schultz' Appellant's Brief (pp. 17-1 8), it 
cannot be said that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case surely did not impact the 
jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction in the Battery 
Case and remand that case for a new trial. 
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